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Abstract 
 
 Though mainstream environmentalism, both in the U.S. and India, was initially 
rooted in social justice, it has, over time, moved away from this focus. The 
Environmental Justice Movement consequently arose to reunite social and environmental 
activism. In this thesis, I trace the historical relationship between the mainstream 
environmentalism, the Environmental Justice Movement, and marginalized communities. 
After providing this general overview, I examine two case studies – in Los Angeles and 
New Delhi respectively – where marginalized communities have been involved in 
Environmental Justice activities. My analysis reveals that marginalized communities 
often act in an ‘environmentalist’ or ‘environmentally friendly’ manner, without defining 
their actions as such. That is, their socio-political activism often is or becomes 
environmental because of the contexts it operates within.  
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Chapter One: The Political Economy of Environmental Justice 
 
 
In this chapter, I will trace the history and relationship between the Environmental 
Justice Movement (EJM) and mainstream environmentalism in American and Indian 
contexts. In both these countries, mainstream environmentalism was initially rooted, to 
differing extents, in social justice. Over time, however, it has moved away from these 
roots and instead focused on litigation and corporate engagement, activities that tend to 
prevent the participation of disenfranchised or marginalized citizens, and people who lack 
higher education. Because one type of experience has disappeared from mainstream 
environmentalism (experience, that is, of the hazards caused by industry and poverty) the 
movement has, in general, moved away from fighting for the rights of people and (and 
in) the environment, and instead defending the environment against people. By and large, 
it is disenfranchised or otherwise marginalized populations that are forgotten, or worse, 
harmed by this type of activism.  
In response to the changing concerns of mainstream environmentalism, several 
Environmental Justice (EJ) groups have emerged, both in the U.S. and India, to fight for 
the rights of the aforementioned populations. Traditionally, however, these groups do not 
see themselves as supporting an ‘environmental’ cause. Rather, they are simply fighting 
for social and economic rights, for the health of their community, indeed, for their 
survival. But because of the contexts shaping their protest (a government’s pollution or 
waste policy, for example) these groups should be considered as environmentalist. It is 
important to reclaim the definition or meaning of ‘environmentalism’. Indeed, it is only 
4	  	  
through reflecting on our definition of concepts like ‘environment’ (and by extension, our 
relation to this ‘environment’) can we understand the factors that shaped today’s political 
economy of environmental justice. Brief descriptions of my two case studies will better 
illustrate my claim. 
Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angles (CCSCLA), who I focus on in 
my second chapter, is an organization that successfully opposed the Los Angeles waste 
board’s plans to construct a dangerous Waste-to-Energy incinerator in South Central, an 
economically marginalized and predominantly African-American neighborhood of LA. 
They opposed the landfill because of the health and economic hazards it would bring to 
the community. However, their protest was innately environmental because the 
incinerator would have released dangerous pollutants into the air.  
Similarly, informal waste workers in Okhla, on whom I focus my third chapter, 
protested the construction of a Waste-to-Energy incinerator in their neighborhood 
because it would burn and thus separate them from their primary source of income. (The 
waste workers collect and sell recyclable items from landfills.) They protested the 
incinerator for socio-economic reasons, but given the air pollution the incinerator would 
create, and the carbon friendly nature of their recycling, their protest was innately 
environmental as well.  
 In both these cases, marginalized communities – African Americans in Los 
Angeles (LA), migrant, informal workers in Delhi – were overlooked by policymakers 
and mainstream environmental groups (MEGs). Indeed, their socio-economic oppression 
arose because of a biased or poorly informed environmental policy. This context is what 
makes their socio-economic protests also environmental protests. By tracing the tracing 
5	  	  
the history of EJM and mainstream environmentalism, I aim to show how socio-
economic protest also comes to become environmental protest. This exploration will 
necessarily make us question the definitions ‘environment’ or ‘environmental work’ that 
are currently employed.  
* 
 Most historians situate the origins of the American Environmental Justice 
Movement (EJM) 1  in protests orchestrated by the African American of community 
Warren County, North Carolina against a proposed landfill in1982.2 By designating the 
Warren County protests as the start of something new, historians implicitly define the 
EJM as separate from, or in opposition to America’s second wave of environmentalism 
(SWE)  which rose in the 1960’s and remains the model for most modern mainstream 
environmental groups (MEG) today. There are many reasons for marking this separation.  
It was during the Warren protests that veterans of the Civil Rights Movement 
were majorly involved in environmental work for the first time. Up until then, 
environmental activism had overwhelmingly been orchestrated by well-educated, white 
citizens, and concerned with “wilderness” areas rather than spaces inhabited by humans.3 
Furthermore, despite their eventual failure to block the landfill, Warren’s protestors 
inspired minority populations across America to take up the environmental cause. It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines Environmental Justice as the “fair 
treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national 
origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”   
2 McGurty, Eileen M. "From NIMBY to Civil Rights: The Origins of the Environmental 
Justice Movement." Environmental History 2.3 (1997): 302. JSTOR. Web. 11 Oct. 2012. 
3 Rome, Adam. ""Give Earth a Chance": The Environmental Movement and the Sixties." 
The Journal of American History 90.2 (2003): 538. JSTOR. Web. 08 Nov. 2013. 
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also clear that, for the most part, MEGs at the time did not concern themselves with 
conservation problems of ethnic minorities, and that “racism and other prejudices have 
historically excluded activist of color and grassroots activists from the traditional 
environmental movement.”4 However, this separation between EJM and mainstream 
environmentalism blurs one historical reality.  
By defining EJM in opposition to mainstream environmentalism, we risk 
bracketing the later as environmentalism as a purely white, upper-middle class moment, 
whose actions were based on an altruistic non-anthropocentric concern for ‘nature,’ or, in 
more cynical cases, from a concern about property values. While the actions and agendas 
of many MEGs may reflect this sort of belief, the SWE, in its early years at least, was 
deeply informed by social-political and economic developments (of the 1950s and 60s.) 
Indeed, the SWE has its roots as much in the shift of the liberal agenda from questions of 
individual material prosperity to the “imbalance between private wealth and public 
poverty”, in the feminist, anti-war and labor movements, as it does in scientific 
developments such as the publication of Silent Spring. In other words, the modern 
environmental movement has always been, to an extent, an environmental justice 
movement. Yet, the fact remains that most MEGs have failed to acknowledge or combat 
‘environmental racism’ in a meaningful manner, making second wave environmentalism 
an EJM that has lost its way.  
* 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Cole, Luke W., and Sheila R. Foster. "A History of the Environmental Justice 
Movement." From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the Rise of the 
Environmental Justice Movement. New York: New York UP, 2001. 30. Print. 
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Sheila Foster considers “it more useful to think metaphorically of the movement 
[EJM] as a river, fed over time by many tributaries” rather than through an incident 
focused lens.5 The main tributaries she identifies are anti-toxics movement, the Civil 
Rights movement, the labor movement, and the involvement of academics. To this, she 
adds that a “very small, and late, tributary to the EJM [was] the traditional environmental 
movement. Perhaps it is the history of the environmental movement that has made it such 
a small contributor to the EJM.”6 Her point regarding the history of traditional (or 
mainstream) environmentalism requires clarification. Foster does not claim that 
mainstream environmentalism has always been the bastion of well off preservationists. In 
fact, she even admits that the SWE “grew out of the ferment of the 1960s” and like the 
“Civil Rights Movement and the anti-Vietnam War movement [was] explicitly oriented 
towards social justice.”7 In time, however, second-wave environmentalists have moved 
away from their social justice orientation.  
This transition is clearly reflected in the movement’s change in modus operandi, 
and the shifting demographic of its participants. Second-wave environmentalists “moved 
from a participatory strategy based on broad mobilization of the interested public, such as 
that used in the civil rights and anti-war movements, to an insider strategy based on 
litigation, lobbying, and technical evaluation.”8 Forster notes, not unsympathetically, that 
this shift from street protest to litigation “coincided with the traditional groups’ desire to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Cole, Luke W., and Sheila R. Foster. "A History of the Environmental Justice 
Movement." From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the Rise of the 
Environmental Justice Movement. New York: New York UP, 2001. 20. Print. 
6 Ibid., 28. 
7 Ibid., 29. 
8 Ibid. 
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control the environmental establishment or at least to have power within it.”9 While such 
groups’ intentions might have been admirable – admirable but harmful intentions will be 
a recurrent theme in my thesis – it ended up excluding “those without expertise from 
much of environmental decision making.”10 People ‘without expertise’ are usually people 
who have not received specialized higher education. It is not difficult to see that this 
group would largely consist of members of ethnic minorities and economically 
suppressed classes. 
 Viewed from a policy perspective, SWE’s shift in focus towards litigation makes 
sense. After all, it expedited much vital litigation such as the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA)11 and Clean Air Act (CAA).12 But this ‘streets-to-courts’ transition 
(one that is socio-economic as well as spatial) is very disconcerting when considered 
from a social perspective. For by changing their arena of operation, second-wave 
environmentalists assumed a false discontinuity between human habitation and the 
‘environment.’ When protesting against the Vietnam War or against melting ice-caps, it 
is possible for an group to switch its focus from street protests’ to ligation, because the 
issue being protested is far from home (that is, not on the streets). When second-wave 
environmentalists made this same shift, they lost sight of the various environmental 
problems such as garbage disposal, air pollution, toxic water, soil and food, which local 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 30. 
11 NEPA, in fact, was the act that made Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) 
necessary for all projects that could have significant environmental consequences. EIS 
has proven to be an effective tool for reform. 
12 Cole, Luke W., and Sheila R. Foster. "A History of the Environmental Justice 
Movement." From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the Rise of the 
Environmental Justice Movement. New York: New York UP, 2001. 30. Print. 
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people faced. As with most of these problems, economically oppressed and minority 
communities were the worst affected. Thus, by switching their focus to litigation, second-
wave environmentalists excluded those that had most direct experience or contact with of 
environmental dangers and hazards. As this schism widened and ossified over time, the 
environmental problems of minority groups and urban populations came to be regarded 
as ‘specialized’ concern. Indeed, the schism seems to have effaced the social justice roots 
of SWE. This is why, in 1971, 58% of the Sierra Club members noted that the club 
“should [not] concerns itself with the conservation problems of such special groups as 
the urban poor and ethnic minorities (my italics).”13 And this is why a critic like Charles 
W Mills can claim that “traditional environmentalism has not been political…[its] 
primary concerns have been framed as technical – how best and most efficiently to 
handle ecological problems – and moral – what are our responsibilities to other animals 
and to the natural wilderness are.”14 
* 
 Before analyzing the ramifications of SWE’s break from its social justice roots, it 
is worth exploring how it was socially oriented to begin with. Historians, Adam Rome 
believes that the growth of liberal environmental agenda (as a result of the party’s switch 
in focus from ‘quantitative liberalism’ to ‘qualitative liberalism’), the grass-roots 
activism of middle-class women (as part of the feminist movement), and the 
countercultural movement driven by the writings of Allen Ginsberg and Gary Snyder, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid. 
14 Westra, Laura, and Peter S. Wenz. "Black Trash." Faces of Environmental Racism: 
Confronting Issues of Global Justice. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. 72. 
Print. 
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were vital to shaping the SWE. Each of these influences were rooted in or related to 
social justice.  
In the 1950s, Democratic intellectuals like historian Arthur Schlesinger and 
economist John Galbraith began re-evaluating the modern liberal agenda.15 In particular, 
they questioned what liberalism could offer in a “time of unprecedented affluence,” a 
time when people were able to purchase and consume increasing amounts of products.16 
Their solution was to turn from a ‘quantities liberalism’ to a ‘qualitative liberalism,’ and 
thus to shift the government’s focus from satisfying individual comforts to the “problem 
of social balance” and the lack of community services.17 Environmental conservation 
became an important part of the new agenda. Schlesinger and Galbraith argued that 
pollution and waste creation were economic harms. They harmed America’s national 
resources, which were a public good. Urbanists like Catherine Wurster worried about the 
effects “vanishing opens space and spreading pollution” would have to the health of a 
community.18  Environmental problems, then, were considered a subset of the larger 
individualist and consumerist culture that threatened to harm America’s socio-economic 
fabric. In this way, it was very closely related to problems of race or education. 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson played major roles in promoting the liberal agenda. 
Johnson in particular, considered environmental reforms to be central to his vision of a 
Great Society. Indeed, Rome goes so far as to argue that conservation and civil rights 
were of comparable concerns for Johnson. Johnson stressed in a May 1964 speech: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Rome, Adam. ""Give Earth a Chance": The Environmental Movement and the Sixties." 
The Journal of American History 90.2 (2003): 527. JSTOR. Web. 08 Nov. 2013. 
16 Ibid., 528. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 530. 
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The abolition of poverty and racial justice [would be] just the beginning…The Great 
Society [would be] a place where man can renew contact with nature …We have always 
prided ourselves on being not only America the strong…and free but America the 
beautiful…Today that beauty is in danger. The water we drink, the food we eat, the very 
air that we breathe, are threatened with pollution.19 
 
His rhetoric would deeply resonate with any member of the EJM. EJM Groups such as 
CCSCLA fought for a community’s right to live in a healthy environment, and to have 
access to unpolluted resources. Furthermore, their goals were not narrowly 
‘environmental’. They were also concerned, like Johnson, with quality of education, 
health, and life overall. For them, the environment was not an idyllic nature that had to be 
protected from humans. Rather, they challenged socio-economic systems that consigned 
both the humans and natural environment of a particular area to oppression. 
In the 1960s, a growing awareness of the dangers and pervasiveness of pollution 
seemed to galvanize women differently than it did men. Women, primarily middle-class 
housewives, got involved, en masse, with the anti-toxics movement at the time. Their 
response seemed particularly driven by domestic concerns: 
Many women became active response to an environmental threat that hit home. This was 
especially true in suburbia – the most rapidly changing environment in the 
nation….Because the suburbs were domestic places – and women were traditionally 
caretakers of the domestic – threats to environmental quality in suburbia were threats to 
the women’s sphere…For many middle-class women, therefore, the environmental cause 
seemed a natural extension of their concerns as housewives and mothers.20 
 
Paradoxically, their involvement in environmental work was what allowed them to 
transcend or escape domestic limitations. Rome argues that simply by organizing and 
protesting, women, “without using the language of feminism, effectively called into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid., 533. 
20 Ibid., 538. 
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question the boundaries of the women’s sphere.”	  21	  These two traits – women’s control of 
the domestic sphere, and their eventual liberation from it – will reappear, with remarkable 
similarity, when we consider CCSCLA. Because CCSCLA’s founders, and a majority of 
its members, were women. Given the existing gender norms in south central, their 
political organizing was thus intrinsically a radical and feminist act.     
Rome’s final factor – radicalism – played a less explicit, but never the less 
important role in CCSCLA’s struggle too. As its founder Robin Cannon admits, 
CCSCLA, in many ways, emerged to fill the void left by the Black Panther party. Just as 
peace protestors, and students affected by writings of radical and ‘eastern’ influenced 
writers like Snyder found an amiable cause in the environmental movement (“Give Earth 
A Chance,” as Rome highlights, quickly came to replace “Give Peace A Chance” during 
Earth Day), minority embers of various EJMs recognized that the environmental hazards 
they were being subjected to were very much part of an overall system that was racially 
biased.   
And yet, despite all these similarities, SWE broke away from its social justice 
roots. But this break was not complete.. SWE might have lost a part of its radical nature, 
but it never the less attracts radicals today. Likewise, a large number of women are 
involved in and leading various environmental groups. Why, then, did a separate 
movement emerge to represent ethnic minorities? Why, given the overwhelming 
congruence between minority EJ group like CCSCLA’s concerns and those of SWE’s 
founding members, did SWE never properly represent minority communities? 
* 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid., 540. 
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The simple answer seems to be that minority members never compromised a 
significant percentage of SWE groups. Historian Eileen McGurty notes that when 
African-Americans protesting the landfill in Warren, NC “spoke about the involvement 
of environmental organizations in the controversy, they only referred to the governmental 
agencies that made environmentally related decisions, especially the EPA.”22 These 
protestors never considered reaching out to MEAs such as the EDF or Sierra Club, 
probably because MEAs had never made their presence felt in the area before. Indeed, the 
partnership between white protestors and African-American protestors against the landfill 
was initially an awkward one. White protestors had treated the landfill simply “as a 
technical issue of NIMBY”, and it was only once Civil Rights veterans got involved that 
the protests took on a racial tone.23 In hindsight, it seems quite arbitrary to designate the 
Warren protests as the birth of EJM given how suddenly protestors reframed a technical 
issue as a racial concern. This does not mean that placement of a landfill that threatened 
to contaminate groundwater and soil in the only majority African-American county in 
North Carolina was not, at least in part, racially motivated.24 It most certainly was. What 
is striking, rather, is the protestors’ gradual discovery of the racial bias that had gone into 
selecting a location for the landfill.  
 Most minority communities across the U.S. shared this predicament at the time. 
Inspired or rather provoked by the events at Warren, several American academics, led by 
Robert Bullard, began to study the disparity in the application of environment (and in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 McGurty, Eileen M. "From NIMBY to Civil Rights: The Origins of the Environmental 
Justice Movement." Environmental History 2.3 (1997): 316. JSTOR. Web. 11 Oct. 2012. 
23 Ibid., 310. 
24 Ibid., 317. 
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particular, waste) related laws between white and African-American communities. In the 
following decades, various studies were conducted – none, however, by the EPA – to 
analyze the correlation between race and environmental burdens in the US. Here are 
some of the especially shocking results they found: 
1. In 1992, the National Law Journal noted that “Penalties under hazardous waste laws at 
sites having a greatest white population were 500% higher than penalties with the 
greatest minority population, averaging $335,566 for white areas, compared to $55,318 
for minority areas.”25 
2. A 1990 Greenpeace report found that “communities with existing incinerators have 
89% more people of color than the national average; communities where incinerators are 
proposed for construction have minority populations that are 60% higher than the national 
average.”26 
Up until the Greenpeace report, most MEA did not display much interest in 
environmental racism, partly because they hardly suspected that such a thing might exist. 
It was thus up to minority organizations – usually those related with Civil Rights or 
religion – to broaden their mandate and conduct studies. Perhaps the most important of 
these studies was The United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice’s landmark 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Westra, Laura, and Peter S. Wenz. "Decision Making." Faces of Environmental 
Racism: Confronting Issues of Global Justice. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1995. 5. Print. 
26 Ibid., 6. 
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Toxic Wastes and Race in the U.S., published in 1983, which “found race to be the single 
most important factor in the location of abandoned toxic waste sites.”27	  
Another salient feature of the government’s landfill policy was that it targeted 
economically impoverished communities so as to capitalize on the local’s willingness to 
part with their land, or to welcome industrial development, regardless of its dangers. In 
this way, residents were forced to choose between poverty and environmental danger. 
And the more polluted an area was, the less likely it was to attract conventional or safe 
businesses. Thus, government actions often perpetuated a vicious cycle. Given the 
preexisting correlation between race and economic class in the US, this policy was 
tantamount to institutional racism. Indeed, this was the case with Warren. 
Given these realities, in hindsight, we must conclude that SWE, despite its roots 
in social justice, has failed – and always failed – to meaningfully represent ethnic 
minorities in America. This failure was exacerbated by most MEGs transition from street 
protest to litigation, but it has been a salient feature of the movement from its conception. 
Despite its many ills, SWE’s legacy of ignoring racial concerns has had one unintended 
and positive consequence. Because they were left to fight on their own, many minority EJ 
organizations such as the United Church of Christ and CCSCLA have had to pass through 
a thorough self-education in environmental research, organizing and so forth. Thus, 
instead of inheriting the lessons of the past, these organizations have had to learn them 
through first-hand experience. 
* 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Bullard, Robert D. "Environmental Justice for All." Unequal Protection: 
Environmental Justice and Communities of Color. San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1994. 17. 
Print. 
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 It would not be an overstatement to claim that two main factors – India’s broad 
social contexts (issues of race and class in the U.S. are substantially equivalent to issues 
of caste, ethnicity, class in India); and the complex nature and functioning of the 
postcolonial state – combine to create most of India’s EJ issues. In India, the colonial 
British government usually set up legislative and bureaucratic systems to extract the 
nation’s resources rather than to benefit locals. Whether it be the acquisition of large 
swathes of forest land, or the establishment of a centralized water system, these 
government systems inevitable separated communities (tribal communities that lived in 
the forest, or villages that were flooded by large dams) from vital resources, or from their 
land all together. Given the far-reaching and still powerful legacy of British colonial rule 
– a legacy carried on by the post-independence state – most of India’s modern EJ issues 
involve a similar confrontation between disenfranchised groups such as peasants, tribals, 
migrants – who are having their resources taken away from them – and the forces of big-
business and a centralized government. 
 Post-independence India is in many ways a ‘weak-strong’ state. A large number 
of its environmental programs are overly ambitious yet incompletely realized. Like most 
centralized programs, they primarily benefit urban middle class and elite communities 
(by bringing them resources from various parts of the country) and harm poor, rural 
communities (who make up a majority of the country’s population). In this way, the state, 
as economist Glyn Williams remarks, has “itself has historically been an important site of 
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misdistribution.”	  28	  	   This history of misdistribution has shaped the political economy of India’s EJ in 
two important ways. On one hand, it has created a very powerful suspicion of state power 
and intervention in almost all EJ groups. Unlike the US, where such suspicion is usually 
limited to the state’s operations, in India, EJ groups often aim their protests against the 
jurisdiction or very presence of the state itself. This suspicion has also been reinforced by 
the Indian government’s historical policy of “tilting the economy in favor of industry, 
modern intensive agriculture and commercial exploitation of resources,” which, in 
different ways, have further separated traditionally decentralized communities – both 
‘formal’ and ‘informal – from their land.29 On the other hand, it has united EJ groups in 
their faith that “a rescaling of development projects and environmental governance to the 
local level, rather than the search for global reform or restructuring” is required to create 
meaningful change.”30 
Because of the intensely social nature of most of its troubles, India, unlike the US, 
has not had an EJ movement that arose in opposition too, or exists separately from 
mainstream environmentalism. Given that 68% of India still lives in rural areas, and that 
a majority of India’s farmers (49% of the population) are involved in subsistence 
farming, the environment’s direct impact on human lives (as evidenced by droughts, 
farmer suicides, floodings, pesticide related epidemics) is far more – for want of a less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Williams, Glyn, and Emma Mawdsley. "Postcolonial Environmental Justice: 
Government and Governance in India." Geoforum 37 (2006): 668. Elsevier. Web. 15 Apr. 
2015. 
29 Ibid., 663. 
30 Ibid. 
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graceful word – visible.31 This gives an anthropocentric urgency to almost all 
environmental protests, and turns almost all environmental groups into environmental 
justice groups. Nevertheless, there remain social inequities within the movement. 
 These inequities are most pronounced in work done by civil society organizations 
or urban civil society individuals, especially those that file public interest litigations. 
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) – is a legal device that enables citizens to challenge 
government legislations in the name of public interest.32 Given the preexisting (and 
stupendous) inequalities with regard to education and monetary resources, it is obvious 
that PILs will primarily be filed by members of the middle and elite classes. What has 
been really harmful however, is that these citizens, though usually driven by positive 
intentions, often use PILs “to pursue their own interests…at the expense of the poor.”33 
That is, civil society members often promote legislation that ‘improves’ the ‘overall’ 
cleanliness or environmental standards in a city or region, at the expense of the homeless, 
workers in the informal economies and so forth, whose homes and places of business are 
demolished or who are forced to relocate in the name of better order.  
The Okhla wastepickers’ reflects three major traits I have listed. Okhla’s 
wastepickers, who are informal economy workers, have historically operated outside 
urban government regulation, but very much within – both spatially and socio-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 "Rural Population (% of Total Population)." The World Bank. Accessed March 26, 
2015. 
32 Gidwani, Vinay K. "The Right to Waste : Informal Sector Recyclers and Struggles for 
Social Justice in Post-reform Urban India." India's New Economic Policy: A Critical 
Analysis. New York: Routledge, 2011. 134. Print. 
33 Williams, Glyn, and Emma Mawdsley. "Postcolonial Environmental Justice: 
Government and Governance in India." Geoforum 37 (2006): 666. Elsevier. Web. 15 Apr. 
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economically – urban society. As we shall later see, the government has recently decided 
to formalize (that is, centralize and corporatize) their work, and in the process rendered 
their occupation illegal.  In other words, through imposing a centralized power structure, 
the Indian government is separating a disenfranchised community from its main source of 
livelihood, which we have previously established as a standard cause for EJ troubles in 
India. Furthermore, because of their ‘informal’ status, these wastepickers have been 
overlooked by most civil society organizations and national policy bodies.  
* 
 The informal economy is “characterized by small-scale, labor-intensive, largely 
unregulated and unregistered, low-technology manufacturing or provision of services.”34 
It exists in various parts of the developing world, and finds niches to operate within in 
several different industries.  India’s informal economy produces over “60%35 of GDP 
beyond the regulative and protective reach of the state.”36  Yet the prevalent public 
discourse promoted by the government and civil society is overwhelmingly focused on 
the development of the formal economy. 
Because the formal economy can be taxed, and because it can receive Foreign 
Direct Investment, it “commands privilege in urban policy and planning circles as the 
engine that drives production and consumption and ensures the government its cash 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Wilson, David C., Costas Velis, and Chris Cheeseman. "Role of Informal Sector 
Recycling in Waste Management in Developing Countries." Habitat International 30 
(2006): 797. Elsevier. Web. 22 Mar. 2015. 
35 This number includes earnings made by subsistence agricultures and un-unionized 
farm and factory workers. 
36 Harriss-White, Barbara, and Nandini Gooptu. "Mapping India's World of Unorganized 
Labour." Socialist Register 37 (2001): 90. Print. 
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flow.”  In reality, however, the separation between India’s formal and informal 
economies is not black and white. For example, a majority of production inputs and 
consumption goods utilized by the formal sector “are manufactured from the informal 
sector: everything from electric cables…portable fans, paints, industrial solvents.” These 
products are the preview of the informal economy because they are available in great 
abundance at landfills, and can thus be sold cheap second-hand. Many small business 
owners or individuals would not be able to afford them at commercial rates.  
The informal economy also plays an essential role in providing many vital middle 
class comforts such as domestic aid, vegetables on delivery, and – I will focus on this in 
my third chapter – door-to-door waste collection. Bharati Chaturvedi, a Marxist 
economist, goes so far as to assert that the “well-being of the formal sector company and 
its employees is critically dependent on goods and services provided by the informal 
sector.”37  
The informal economy has historically played a vital role in India’s waste 
management. There are several different and inter-dependent roles within the informal 
waste sector: 
Residents and shopkeepers sell recyclable items, such as newspaper, glass, containers, tin 
cans etc. to kabariwallas or iterant waste collectors. The waste pickers retrieve recyclable 
materials from what is discarded by households commercial establishments and industries 
from municipal wastes. Large commercial establishments and industries sell the 
recyclable waste to waste dealers in bulk, who then sell it recyclers.38 
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India’s and especially Delhi’s, informal waste workers form a discrete social group. Most 
are migrants from rural India who have been driven to the city by unemployment and 
rural poverty. Given their migratory status and economic situation, most of these workers 
don’t have permanent or formal housing or a ‘legal right’ to live within the city. They are 
thus members of an impoverished social class. Never the less, their presence was 
ubiquitous in many well-off neighborhoods, and their occupation was very much vital to 
middle class and elite life.  
              In the 1990s, for example, many of Delhi’s citizens filed PILs accusing the 
government of not paying attention to the nation’s waste management problems. PILs 
such as B.L. Wadhera v. The Union of India and Others (1996) and Almitra Patel v. the 
Union of India and Others (1996) had a considerable impact on the Indian government’s 
waste policy. Along with provoking several dramatic moments in court that involved the 
public humiliation of municipal officials, they led to the framing and enactment of India’s 
first Bio-Medical Waste Management and Handling Rules, and Solid Waste Management 
and Handling Rules. Before these PILs, the government had not considered it necessary 
to regulate the disposal of bio-medical and solid waste to any extent. The new rules, for 
the first time, brought regulation to an aspect of civic functioning that up until then had 
just been happening, formally or informally. 
Concerned citizens like Wadhera and Patel certainly filed their PILs with positive 
intentions. However, they severely underplayed, and indeed effaced the relevance of 
informal economy recyclers to the task of urban waste management.” They failed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
December, 2003. Chennai: Department of Geography, University of Madras and Faculty 
of Environmental Studies, York University. Page 453 
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acknowledge the recycler’s importance, their “right to livelihood of informal sector 
recycling workers,” and, in the process, even threatened waste picker’s rights to access 
living spaces in urban India. This attitude is symptomatic of the India’s government and 
middle-class’s general neglect of the country’s lower class, and its informal economy 
workers. It has been the cause of the limitation of failures of several EJ movements as 
well as government policies. Given the combination of their impoverishments – informal 
workers are migrants, usually poorly educated, driven to waste work by dire economic 
circumstances, often ‘illegals’ in the city – it has been especially hard for them to 
organize to defend their rights.  
 Luckily, however, MEGs such as Shrishti in Bangalore and Chintan in New 
Delhi, have published papers, conducted protests, and worked with waste workers so as 
to defend their rights. As is the case with many American Environmental Justice 
movements, India’s wastepickers are fighting for their own survival, and simply by virtue 
of this, are supporting an environmental cause. This is because their work has historically 
been ‘environmentally friendly.’ Wastepickers were the first and only group to actively 
engage in recycling, and, as we shall later see, their occupation saved more carbon credits 
than most major government interventions. Yet, simply because of its ‘informality,’ 
however, it was targeted for exploitation by the government. 
* 
Thus, my thesis will consider the impact of Waste-to-Energy incinerators in two 
communities – South Central Lost Angeles, and Okhla, a suburb of Delhi. Both these 
incinerators were constructed (or proposed) by centralized governing bodies that did not 
recognize the rights of the community in which it would build its incinerator. In the case 
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of South Central, the incinerator would have caused great health and environmental harm 
to the community through its release of toxins and other associated polluting activities. In 
Okhla, the incinerator has both robbed an impoverished community of its main source of 
livelihood, and also undone the community’s remarkable environmental work. What 
unites Okhla’s wastepickers and CCSCLA is the how their concerns were excluded from 
traditional environmental policymaking, and consequently, how their socio-economic 
protests became environmental because of the contexts that surrounded them.  
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Chapter Two: Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles – A 
Case Study 
 
 
 
In 1984, Cerrell Associates, a Los Angles consulting firm, submitted a report 
titled Political Difficulties Facing Waste-to-Energy Conversion Plant Siting to the 
California Waste Management Board (the state’s apex recycling and waste management 
agency). The Cerrell Report, as it later came to be known, was commissioned with 
ostensibly good intentions. At the time, California was facing an immense solid waste 
disposal problem. Over “35 million tons of garbage [was being] landfilled in municipal 
disposal facilities” in-state per anum.39 If things continued at that rate, the state would 
have lost an estimated 50 percent of its landfill capacity within a year, and would have 
had no empty landfills by the end of the decade.40 The California Waste Management 
Board41 believed that Waste-to-Energy facilities were an ideal solution to their mounting 
problems. Waste-to-Energy facilities contained a new type of garbage incinerator that 
both burnt solid waste and created steam energy. They were thus more environmentally 
friendly and economically sustainable than landfills. Because of these merits, California’s 
waste board wanted to construct Waste-to-Energy facilities in as many optimal locations 
as possible.  
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Associates, 1984. Web. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Henceforth referred to as ‘waste board’. 
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However, as the Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives (GAIA) has shown, 
most of the environmental benefits associated with Waste-to-Energy incinerators are 
really myths. Over 90% of materials that are disposed in “incinerators can be reused, 
recycled and composted.”42 Thus, by building incinerators, the waste board was almost 
promoting waste. Furthermore, studies have shown that “among U.S. industries, the 
waste incineration industry has the highest ratio of negative economic impacts from air 
pollution compared to the financial value added by the industry.”43  
Though these facts were not well known to the public at the time, no communities 
wanted Waste-to-Energy facilities in their neighborhood because of the generally 
negative aura, both with regard to aesthetics and pollution, they had. As the Cerrell 
Report notes, “the most formidable obstacle to Waste-to-Energy is public opposition. 
People tend to view Waste-to-Energy projects in the same light as any waste disposal 
facility, and they simply do not want a dump nearby.”44 Never the less, California’s waste 
board was convinced of the safety and merits of Waste-to-Energy facilities, and in the 
face of public opposition, contracted Cerrell Associates with drawing up a report that 
isolated the best places and best ways in which to develop them.  
Cerrell coldly analyzed the likeliness of a community protesting an incinerator, 
but never stopped to question why this was so. Their approach was absolutely pragmatic. 	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Waste-to-Energy facilities had to be built, and Cerrell aimed to find the easiest places to 
build them. If Cerrell Associates’ complacency regarding the health and environmental 
dangers of Waste-to-Energy facilities was not questionable enough, the recommendations 
of their report revealed a disturbing disregard for the socioeconomic forces that shape a 
community’s civic involvement and leverage: 
Certain types of people are likely to participate in politics, either by virtue of their issue 
awareness or their financial resources, or both. Members of middle or higher-
socioeconomic strata…are more likely to organize into effective groups to express their 
political interests and views. All socioeconomic groupings tend to resent the nearby siting 
of major facilities, but the middle and upper-socioeconomic strata possess better 
resources to effectuate their opposition. Middle and higher-socioeconomic strata 
neighborhoods should not fall at least within the one-mile and five-mile radii of the 
proposed site [my italics]…all subgroups, people with a college education, young or 
middle-aged, and liberal in philosophy are most likely to organize opposition to the siting 
of a major facility. Older people, people with a high school education or less, and those 
who adhere to a free market orientation are least likely to oppose a facility.45 
 
In this way, the Cerrell Report selected communities with the lowest average incomes 
and lowest education rates as prime locations for Waste-to-Energy facilities.  Given the 
preexisting racial inequities in America, their suggestion was tantamount to declaring 
minority neighborhoods as resistance ‘soft-spots.’  
           Cerrell’s disregard for the socio-economic context of civic involvement also points 
towards another salient feature of the waste board’s Waste-to-Energy plans. Though the 
waste board stressed the economic benefits – cheap energy production – of Waste-to-
Energy incinerators; it was not concerned with channeling these benefits to the same 
neighborhoods where incinerators would be built. Indeed, neighborhoods that had 
incinerators often received none of the energy they produced. In other words, the waste 
board took a context and geography-blind approach to energy production. Instead of 
addressing the needs of specific neighborhoods, they were concerned with improving 	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‘overall’ energy numbers, a top-down approach that was biased against economically 
disadvantaged and minority populations. 
In 1984, based on the Cerrell report’s recommendations, the L.A. waste board 
selected South Central Los Angeles as the sight of its new LANCER Waste-to-energy 
facility. At the time, South Central was a predominantly minority populated 
neighborhood – 52% of its population is African American and 44% Latino – with a78% 
unemployment rate, average yearly income less than half of LA, and low number of 
college graduates.46 In other words, it was the opposite of a “middle and higher-
socioeconomic strata neighborhood” and was thus a perfect site for a Waste-to-Energy 
facility. South Central also had a long history of government neglect and high pollution 
levels; this made it an even easier target for a polluting facility. Indeed, in a study 
conducted in the early 80s, South Central was found to be “the dirtiest zip code in 
California” as per the federal EPA toxic release inventory data.47 Incinerators would have 
fit right into its landscape. 
By locating an incinerator in South Central, the waste board promoted the type of 
institutional racial bias (with regard to environmental policy) that I detailed in my first 
chapter. Given its demographic, South Central had historically received minimum 
attention from MEGs. This combined with waste board’s racist policy, meant that the 
neighborhood was being subjected to an environmental injustice. In the rest of my 
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chapter, I will detail how South Central’s citizens organized to form an Environmental 
Justice group, Concerned Citizens for South Central Los Angeles, which successfully 
opposed LANCER. 
* 
 The L.A. waste board did not expect much protest from South Central’s citizens – 
this was why the neighborhood had been selected – but they nevertheless attempted to 
speed the construction of the first incinerator, LANCER 1, because activists and officials 
would have been “hard-pressed to justify killing LANCER 2 on health and environmental 
grounds if LANCER 1 was up and running.”48 Their plan did not work out.  
Because led by Charlotte Bullock and Robin Cannon, a group of South Central’s 
citizens got together, and in a historical move, successfully overcame the L.A. waste 
board to have LANCER, a project which by then the government had already invested 
$12 million dollars on, cancelled. It is worth noting that CCSCLA was manly comprised 
of a high school educated, middle-aged, nonprofessional, low-income individuals with 
little previous political experience. That is, of people that were the very antithesis of the 
Cerrell Report’s prototypical ‘protestors’. 
Most accounts of CCSCLA’s conception begin in dramatic fashion. And rightly 
so. It is a narrative that involves a disadvantaged group discovering the callous, almost 
malevolent plans that a powerful organization, the State, had for them. The State had not 
attempted to conceal its plans. It merely assumed that South Central’s citizens would not 
care or perhaps not understand them. Indeed, the State’s plans were publicly available. 
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            As part of the standard Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, the 
waste board had to conduct a public hearing in which they discussed the LANCER 
project – its costs, benefits, dangers and so forth – with local residents of the area. Robin 
Cannon, an African-American resident of South Central L.A., was then a senior data 
processor technician for the City of Los Angeles, and as a part of her job had to review 
the notification of the city’s public hearing. As someone familiar with the neighborhood, 
Cannon was aware that many of South Central L.A.’s residents suffered from respiratory 
ailments. The prospect of an incinerator being built in the neighborhood thus worried her. 
She had even “suspected for some time that air pollutants associated with established 
industries in her neighborhood contributed” to her family’s and her community’s 
ailments, and was thus further alarmed at the prospect of a toxin releasing incinerator.49  
Academic Robert Bullard notes that industrial flight from inner city urban 
neighborhoods creates an economic vacuum that is often filled by polluting industries. 
Citing South Central in L.A., and other economically advantaged neighborhoods in San 
Francisco, San Diego and Riverside, he highlights the striking correlation between 
crumbling infrastructure and high poverty, and high levels of pollution.50 The economic 
situation in such neighborhoods is often so acute that workers are “forced to choose 
between unemployment and a job that may risk their health, their family’s health, and the 
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health of their community.”51 This, in a sense, is what happened to Cannon and Bullock. 
Being employees of the City of Los Angeles, it was in their best interest to turn a blind 
eye to LANCER’s dangers. However, their personal investment in the issues at hand 
outweighed any potential fears of unemployment. In an interview, Bullock noted that: 
People’s jobs were threatened, ministers were threatened…but I said, “I’m not going to 
be intimidated…” My child’s health comes first…that’s more important than any job.52 
 
Bullock also recognized the dubious and inequality-perpetuating economic rationale 
behind LANCER’s development: 
They’re not brining real development to our community…They’re [bringing] this 
incinerator [that promises fifty jobs]. Meanwhile, they’re going to shut down another 
factory (in Riverside) and eliminate 200 jobs to buy more pollution rights.53 
 
Her observation both ties in with Bullard’s correlation between industrial flight 
and pollution, and also points towards a larger systemic problem – the outsourcing or 
transport of pollution to disadvantaged neighborhoods through cap and trade. Again, it 
was the social problem – job losses – that led Bullock to discover an environmental 
problem – cap and trade.  
 There is also a distinctly racial component to these matters. For industrial flight 
and the government’s free market approach to pollution rights compound to create a 
situation where an disproportionate amount of polluting or waste-management plants are 
situated in minority neighborhoods. Boer’s multivariate analysis of several L.A. 
neighborhoods proves that communities “most likely to host a TDSF [treatment, storage 
and disposal facility] are industrial areas with a large concentration of working-class 	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people of color.54 Furthermore, all the neighborhoods Bullard cites in his industrial flight-
pollution analysis are minority populated. 
Given her concerns, Cannon decided to attend the project’s public hearing, which 
was to happen the following week, with her co-worker and neighbor Charlotte Bullock,	  
who had herself just heard about LANCER. This simple display of civic awareness was 
the first step in the process that led to the formation of CCSCLA.  
* 
 Bullock and Cannon found themselves among forty other skeptical community 
residents at the public hearing, an event that was less a sustained dialogue with the public 
and more an advertising campaign for LANCER. City officials screened a film in which 
African-American actor Brock Peters “endorsed LANCER as an economic revitalization 
project vis-à-vis job creation.55 
Most of these claims were not completely true. For example, Cannon would soon 
realize that the council’s claims about job creation were bogus. Though LANCER would 
need personnel, a “majority of the 50 or so employment opportunities offered by such a 
high-tech operation would be specialized” which meant that most of its employees would 
be brought in from elsewhere because of the lower education levels in South Central 
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L.A.”56 It was the council’s calm denial of LANCER’s environmental and health threats 
that was more troubling. Cannon was alarmed by how city officials discussed the 
emission of dioxins and furans “as if they were nothing to worry about,” and casually 
mentioned that the plant “would operate twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and 
dispose 100,000 gallons of water” daily, as if the coming and going dump trucks would 
not make noise or release fumes. 57 
 After the council’s presentation, Cannon walked on stage and listed her many 
concerns for the project. This turned her into a face for a LANCER ‘protest’ or 
opposition campaign. On one hand, city officials gave her LANCER’s EIR assuming it 
would placate her concerns (or that she would not understand it); on the other, many 
community residents took her phone number assuming that she was a figure of authority. 
Cannon left the hearing with these growing responsibilities, and so spent her entire day 
pouring through LANCER’s EIR. She was shocked by what she read that she called her 
sister to declare, “Sheila, I think they’re trying to kill us!”58 Over the next few weeks, 
awareness of the EIR spread through the neighborhood. The Cannon sisters, Bullock, and 
several others eventually held a meeting together and formed Concerned Citizens for 
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South-Central Los Angeles, an entirely local group that “met every Saturday for two 
consecutive years” and eventually helped overcome LANCER.59  
CCSCLA did not initially consider LANCER to be an ‘environmental problem.’ 
Indeed, although their work had environmental dimensions – air pollution, water 
disposal, and so forth – CCSCLA’s role-models were not the Sierra Club or Greenpeace, 
but rather the Black Panther Party (BPP). Their initial reluctance or disinterest in labels 
of environmentalism is reflective of the overall EJM trends identified in Chapter One.   
Cannon noted that her “education in community development and resource 
knowledge… came from listening to the Black Panthers talk about the need for political, 
economic, and social empowerment in my community in the 1960’s.”60 CCSCLA’s 
members were primarily concerned about the lives of South Central’s citizens, and thus 
thought of themselves as a social justice organization. It was not that CCSCLA was 
unaware of the effects polluted air would have on people. Rather, they understood this 
well enough to see that humans were the primary victims of LANCER’s environmental 
hazards. This convergence of humanitarian and environmental concern would both 
complicate CCSCLA’s movement and be the key to its success, 
In Chapter One, we observed how, SWE came to distance itself from the 
environmental concerns of minority and urban populations. And indeed, CCSCLA’s 
situation was no different. When they approached the Sierra Club and Environmental 
Defense Fund (EDF) for help, CCSCLA’s members were informed that “the poisoning of 
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an urban community by an incarceration facility was a ‘community health issue,’ not an 
environmental one” and thus denied support.61 This (perhaps false) distinction between 
‘community’ and ‘environment’ brings us to one of the central issues CCSCLA raised.  
* 
 Though CCSCLA’s initial concerns were community-oriented, their research led 
them to see the LANCER’s environmental dangers. In this way their experience is similar 
to several original American EJM protestors including the Warren protestors. CCSCLA 
did not stop their organizing once they overcame the waste board’s mandate and had 
LANCER cancelled. Rather, they forced the waste board to set up a recycling program so 
as to ensure that dangerous incinerators like LANCER would not have to be constructed 
again. In other words, they found an environmental solution for their community 
problem. This was an important development, because, as historian Sonya Winton notes: 
By combining the issues of race, concentrated poverty, social isolation, 
and environmental health, leaders of CCSCLA not only made certain that 
South Central LA emerged as a significant focal point of the burgeoning 
modern environmental justice movement that was sweeping the nation, but 
they also effectively challenged an overtly narrow definition of ‘the 
environment’.62  
 
Winton is highlighting how CCSCLA’s were both socio-economic and environmental in 
nature. However, her use of the word ‘combining’ is perhaps misleading. Because South 
Central’s environmental and socioeconomic troubles were combined to begin with. That 
is, they arose from institutional inequalities.  	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 CCSCLA faced racial biases even in the media coverage of their protest. 
Newspapers – both local and national – failed to cover their activities for over a year. 
When Omawale Fowles, a local resident, discovered in the course of her research, that 
LANCER’s Environmental Impact Report (EIR) “lacked the required Health Risk 
Assessment (HRA) – an analysis that identifies and assess environmental risks to public 
health” no media outlet stepped forward to cover this shortcoming.63 No lab or 
environmental organization offered its expertise either. Finally, “Lewis Amand – a 
community resident and graduate student at University of California, Los Angeles 
(UCLA) – petitioned his department” to conduct an independent health analysis, one 
whose results were so shocking that the waste board had to cave in and conduct the 
previously neglected HRA.64 The new HRA, conducted by peer reviewers, led to 
LANCER’s demise.  
         The media was present at the city council’s chambers when CCSCLA brandished 
these results at LANCER’s Conditional Permit hearing in March 1986. But instead of 
interviewing Cannon or Bullock, they asked around for “CCSCLA’s white leader” and 
left on hearing that such a person did not exist.65 Indeed, it was not until CCSCLA 
contacted Not Yet New York, a political organization based in affluent west L.A., did 
they receive any media attention. However, racial biases continued to affect CCSCLA 
even once it became a well-known organization. In fact, when L.A. mayor Tom Bradley 
finally cancelled LANCER in 1987, he invited leaders of mainstream environmental 	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groups (many that had not supported CCSCLA), and no one from CCSCLA, to a photo-
op celebrating its demise.  
           Given its constant struggle with government institutions, with the media, and even 
with mainstream environmental groups (MEGs), CCSCLA’s activities were as much an 
assertion of a minority community’s importance, that is, of racial protest, as it was of 
environmental protest. Indeed, CCSCLA revealed how dubious EIR’s and polluting 
industries are often approved (and thus exist) just because of the government, and, to an 
extent, the media’s disregard of minority issues. As Cannon notes:  
The fight had really turned me around; things are intertwined in ways I hadn’t 
realized…All these social issues as well as political and economic issues are really 
intertwined. Before, I was only concerned about health, and then I began to get into 
politics, decision making, and so many things.66 
* 
Just as there were distinctly social and racial elements to the ‘environmental’ 
issues that CCSCLA was protesting, there were distinctly ‘social-justice’ or feminist 
elements to their internal organization. CCSCLA’s two de-facto leaders (the organization 
never established a definite hierarchy) were both women, as were a majority of its 
constituent members. This was not happenstance. Cynthia Hamilton argues that women 
are more likely than men to act against community health hazards, because community or 
home issues are ‘domestic’ and thus traditionally considered a part of the women’s 
domain.67 Children are also a part of this domestic domain, and many of CCSCLA’s 
women members, Cannon included, despite having “no political experience [or] history 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Hamilton, Cynthia. "Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles." Unequal 
Protection: Environmental Justice and Communities of Color. San Francisco: Sierra 
Club, 1994. 217. Print. 
67 Hamilton, Cynthia. "Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles." Unequal 
Protection: Environmental Justice and Communities of Color. San Francisco: Sierra 
Club, 1994. 210. Print. 
37	  	  
of organizing, responded first as protectors of their children.”68 Hamilton even goes so far 
as to argue that women’s liberation was a significant result of CCSCLA’s struggles.69 
This liberation unfolded on two fronts: at the council chambers, and at home. 
 The primarily male city council members initially dismissed CCSCLA’s concerns 
regarding LANCER’s dangerous health impacts as “irrational, uninformed, and 
disruptive” because CCSCLA members were referring to their children’s health histories 
rather than citing scientific evidence.70 Referring to their own scientific evidence – which 
later turned out to be faulty – experts at the council claimed that dioxin exposure was as 
dangerous as eating peanut butter, and mockingly asked CCSCLA members if this would 
make them stop feeding their children peanut butter sandwiches.71 Gil Lindsay – L.A. 
city council’s first black councilman – was particularly vehement in denying CCSCLA’s 
legitimacy. Using what Winton calls ‘coded misogynist language,’ Lindsay publicly 
pointed to CCSCLA members and declared that, “these people will never be able to 
impact my fellow councilmen.”72 Furthermore, he often conspired to prevent CCSCLA 
members from attending town council meetings, and almost succeeded in sabotaging 
their efforts by attempting to win over the HRA peer review members in the closed door 
meeting. Cannon believed that Lindsay “felt that black women should not have been 
challenging black female leadership.”73 In this way, CCSCLA’s environmental protest 
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also became a critique of patriarchy – one that was developed through practice, rather 
than through theory. By bringing traditionally ‘domestic concerns’ to the professional 
sphere, CCSCLA had managed to see environmental hazards that were overlooked by 
policy makers who were more interested in economic gains and professional 
advancement. 
 CCSCLA activities were empowering within the domestic sphere as well. In an 
ironic twist, political activity which was spurred by a concern for the family, was actually 
straining these women’s familial relations. Since CCSCLA largely progressed without 
external help, its members had to devote a large amount of time to research, door-to-door 
campaigning, and to attending council meetings. This meant that they had less time to 
attend to domestic matters, a development which did not sit well with many of their 
husbands who did not take CCSCLA’s activities seriously. As Cannon notes: 
My husband didn’t take me seriously at first…He just saw a whole lot of women meeting 
and assumed we wouldn’t get anything done…I had to split my time…I’m the one 
usually comes home from work, cooks, helps the kids with their homework…Now the 
kids were on their own…I had my own homework…my husband still wasn’t taking me 
seriously [but he had to] learn to allocate more time to baby-sitting.74 
 
Here again we see how CCSCLA managed to protest against inequality in the 
public and domestic spheres through activism. More than anything, CCSCLA’s members 
strived to assert that their lives, and their way of life – one based on familial care and 
concern, rather than economic gain – deserved protection. Their actions force us to 
reconsider the boundaries that define an ‘environmental protest,’ and to recognize that 
environmental problems are often manifestations of larger systemic issues, and can thus 
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be addressed through several techniques, not only through preservationist discourse that 
frames the environment as an idyllic expanse that must be protected from humans.  
Like CCSCLA, Okhla’s wastepickers conducted protests aimed at protecting their 
occupations and way of life. But given the socio-political context of these protests, they 
turned out to be environmentalist as well. I will detail their struggle and highlight the 
parallels between it and CCSLCA in my next chapter.   
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Chapter Three: Timarpur-Okhla Waste-to-Energy Project – A Case 
Study 
 	  	  
 Like Los Angeles in 1990, New Delhi in 2010 was a city that faced serious and 
growing solid waste management [SWM] problems. Its population has almost doubled 
(from 12.8 million to 24 million) in the past decade, previously rural areas such as 
Ghaziabad and Noida had become suburbs closely connected with the city, and the 
Municipal Corporation of Delhi’s [MCD] three major designated landfills were close to 
reaching their full capacity.75 In addition to their shrinking reserves of land, the MCD 
also faced pressure from the middle class activists (as evidenced by the Wadhera and 
Patel PILs that were mentioned in Chapter One) to modernize their organization. The 
MCD responded to these pressures in two important ways: through the privatization of 
SWM, and through the creation of capital-intensive, large-scale SWM infrastructure such 
as Waste-to-Energy generators. Both these actions were harmful to informal waste 
workers.  
 In theory, the MCD has always been legally bound to manage all of the city’s 
solid waste. In reality, laborers from the informal sector have played an integral role in 
this process for decades. Prior to large-scale privatization that happened in 2004, a 
majority of Delhi’s waste was brought to neighborhood depots called ‘dhalaos’ by 
individual wastepickers (informal economy waste workers) who went from door-to-door 
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collecting waste, and who then separated and sold parts of the waste – through informal 
traders  – for recycling.76 Their numbers were more than considerable:  over 100,000 
waste collectors operated in Delhi, collecting close to 75000 tonnes of waste daily.77 By 
privatizing SWM, the MCD deprived waste workers the ability to go door-to-door 
collecting waste, as private companies would now collect an entire building or housing 
society’s waste and take it directly to dhalao or central landfill.  
           What’s striking about the MCD’s decision was that it didn’t happen in response to 
the ineffectiveness of wastepickers (indeed, as we shall later see, wastepickers have been 
more efficient with recycling than any private organization). Rather, the MCD acted as if 
wastepickers didn’t even exist. Just as L.A.’s Waste Board located a Waste-to-Energy 
plant in South Central on the assumption that South Central’s community members 
would not protest it or be aware of its dangers, the MCD privatized SWM on the 
assumption that wastepickers, given their unclear legal status, did not deserve any 
governmental protection despite the utility they provided. In Chapter One, I described the 
post-independence Indian government’s historical unwillingness to acknowledge the 
rights of various disenfranchised communities. The MCD’s behavior is a typical example 
of this. As Marxist economist Chaturvedi notes, “the shift to capital-intensive waste 
management is…incompatible with labor-intensive methods historically employed in the 
informal sector and has resulted in a socio-technical regime that endangers the 
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livelihoods of the urban poor.”78 
 Privatization was only one part of the MCD’s agenda. The other part involved 
technological advancement. In 2009, the MCD issued tenders for two Waste-to-Energy 
plants to be located in Ghazipur, a suburb of New Delhi where the international airport is 
located.79 Jindal Urban Infrastructure Ltd. – a subsidiary of the Jindal Steel Empire – was 
awarded a tender for a plant to be built in the Okhla landfill.80 The other project was 
cancelled. Construction began on the Timarpur-Okhla plant (as it came to be called) the 
following year, despite vehement protest from 450 residents who live nearby, and 
depended on the landfill, directly or indirectly, for their livelihood. In this aspect, the 
Okhla wastepickers’ story differs from that of CCSCLA.  
           Tughlakabad Extension, Tekhanad Village and Tughlakabad Village – the three 
main residential subdivisions in the Okhla – are neighborhoods whose economies are 
largely (and in two cases, entirely) dependent on waste collected from the Okhla landfill, 
and income generated through this activity. The establishment of a Waste-To-Energy 
generator in Okhla, and the consequent privatization of all waste directed towards that 
landfill, thus signaled an enormous threat to their lives. Sensing this, they, along with the 
Chintan Environmental Research and Action Group, conducted large protests against the 
MCD. Okhla’s residents suffered from greater systematic socio-economic oppression 
than South Central’s citizens. As I mentioned in chapter 1, most waste workers were 
migrants who came to Delhi because of unemployment. Furthermore, many of them did 
not have permanent or formal housing or a ‘legal right’ to live within the city. Despite 	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these trying circumstances, however, the wastepickers organized and began protests soon 
as news of the plant’s spread in the community. They persist with their protests today, 
three years into the plant’s operation. 
 The central parallel between the Okhla wastepickers’ struggle and that of 
CCSCLA is that both communities are fighting a social battle – CCSCLA for minority 
rights; the Okhla wastepickers for their very form of living – but one whose ultimate aims 
turned out to be environmental. Indeed the socio-political and environmental aspects of 
their protests were inextricable. Both questioned the prevalent ideologies upon which the 
government operates.  
*** 
            India’s Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) passed legislation in 2006 
requiring all Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) to involve both an EIA report 
and a public hearing. Jindal Urban Infrastructure fulfilled both requirements. But they 
responded to the letter of the law, not its spirit. Jindal’s public hearing announcement was 
only published in two newspapers, was one sentence long in its entirety, and mentioned 
an “integrated municipal solid waste processing complex” but made no direct reference to 
an incinerator.81 No community member attended the public hearing.  
This event provides two crucial insights: it reveals Jindal’s moral ambivalence, 
and also speaks to the demographics of Okhla’s wastepickers. A Waste-to-Energy 
incinerator’s public hearing, no matter how poorly publicized, would certainly be 
attended in large numbers were the project located in a primarily middle-class or well 
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educated neighborhood. Almost all of Okhla’s residents would be considered members of 
the lower class. Indeed, a majority of them were migrants from West Bengal who had 
come to Delhi with very little qualification or capital, and in search of employment. 
Given that many wastepickers have had incomplete educations, and spend almost the 
entire day working,82 it is unsurprising that a tiny notification in a newspaper went 
unnoticed. It is possible, but highly unlikely that one or two of them read EIA 
announcement. After all, it would take only one person reading it for news to disseminate 
through the community.  
The announcement, made in newsprint, rather than in person, again underlines the 
unequal distinctions between formal and informal parts of the economy. For years, 
wastepickers had conducted their business free from the legal restraints or attentions of 
the government. When the time for change came, however, their actions were entirely 
overlooked. Indeed, the government’s reasons for setting up a Waste-to-Energy plant at 
Okhla are darkly ironic, because the project’s two central goals – monetization (and thus 
incentivization) of waste management, and environmental protection – were better 
achieved by the informal sector than they currently are through Jindal’s activities. 
           By privatizing SWM, the MCD attempted to “augment the value of waste”, to 
change it from being “viewed as an inconvenient by-product to being subsumed within 
circuits of capital and subject to capitalist laws of value.”83 But this is only half the story. 
Because wastepickers, in many ways, were the first community to view waste as a 
commodity of value. Wastepickers, scrap collectors, junk dealers and so forth, created an 	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economy where solid waste – historically unmanaged and unmonitored – was collected, 
painstakingly sifted through, and then returned to the commercial economy in the form of 
recyclable parts and raw materials. They were not acting on an altruistic mandate that 
involved environmentalism or civic duty. Like entrepreneurs, wastepickers in Okhla 
responded to the socio-economic situation they were in – one of social marginalization, 
economic despondency, and inability to achieve formal employment – by harvesting the 
one resource they had access to: solid waste. In this way, they created a carbon-friendly 
economy where there was none before. Thus, the MCD did not really ‘monetize’ solid 
waste by privatizing SWM. Rather, they merely monopolized an existing democratic 
economy. The MCD’s end-of-pipe solution gave an individual organization monopolistic 
control over waste in all stages of its existence (that is, at individual households, at 
dhalaos, and at landfills). 
           Solid waste has historically not been a “municipal property until it reaches a 
formal disposal point.”84 Wastepickers operated in a legal gray zone where they were 
allowed to collect waste from individual households, but not from dhalaos or landfills 
(though, in reality these activities were allowed to). In order to privatize waste all along 
the disposal chain, the MCD had to pass legislation that overruled or replaced 
wastepickers rights to door-to-door collection.  Scholars have described this sort of 
strong-arming as “accumulation by dispossession” a process by which owners of capital 
“separate, by force if necessary, laborers [wastepickers] from the means of production 
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[waste, transfer stations, etc.].”85 The similarity between the wastepickers separation from 
their resources, and that of laborers in other industries, forces us to probe the real 
economic rationale behind the privatization of Delhi’s SWM, and their installation of a 
Waste-to-Energy incinerator.  
 Proponents of Waste-to-Energy will argue that the economic benefits of such 
plants – regardless of their environmental merits or demerits – are indisputable. In one 
sense this is true. Okhla’s wastepickers were earning enough for their own livelihoods, 
and introducing some raw materials and products back into the economy, but they were 
not generating electricity. By burning waste, a public resource, Jindal Urban would be 
generating electricity, a public good. But in reality, the equation was not so simple. 
MCD’s tender agreement stated that Jindal would have to sell all its electricity to the 
Delhi Transmission Utility (Transco) at a fixed tariff. The final Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA), however, contained an unpublicized clause that allowed Jindal to 
channel all energy generated at Okhla towards captive use.86 Thus, in essence, Jindal had 
purchased a public good (that wastepickers previously shared in a decentralized and 
democratic manner) and used it for their own profit.  
          The consequences of this move, as we shall soon see, harmed the environment. But 
it is important to note that the Okhla Waste-to-Energy incinerator was first and foremost 
facilitated by a socio-economic wrong. Had wastepickers not treated Delhi’s dhalaos and 
landfills as a public ‘common,’ were waste picking part of the formal sector, Jindal would 
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not have been able to take control over the Okhla landfill. But Okhla’s wastepickers were 
un-unionized workers and their occupation unrecognized by the MCD. Today, a common 
rallying cry during Okhla wastepicker protests is “Koora Humara Aapka, Nahin kisee ke 
baapka [Waste belongs to all of us; it is not the private entitlement of any one 
individual”] – a sentiment which addresses the flawed ideology upon which the MCD 
awarded Jindal the Okhla landfill.”87  
                                                                          * 
 Most major American environmental groups failed to recognize CCSCLA’s 
activities as ‘environment-related,’ at the outset of their operations at least. The situation 
has been different with Okhla’s wastepickers. NGOs Chintan and All India Kabadi 
Mazdoor Mahasangh (AIKMM) have recognized the environmental benefits of the 
wastepickers work. Indeed, Chintan has rigorously quantified the GHG emissions saved 
through the Okhla wastepickers’ activities, and also calculated the percentage of waste 
they recycle per anum. A shocking image arises when these figures are compared against 
those of the Jindal Waste-to-Energy plant.  
 Chintan estimates that Delhi’s wastepickers, combined, reduce estimated 962,133 
tons of Carbon Dioxide per anum” which is equivalent to reducing removing 176,215 
passenger vehicles from the road, and is more than three times the emission reduction the 
MCD estimates the Timarpur-Okhla plant creates.88 Okhla’s wastepickers comprise only 
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a small subgroup of all wastepickers in Delhi. However, if we consider recycling figures 
this single subgroup does better than the entire Timarpur-Okhla plant. On a year-to-year 
average, Okhla’s wastepickers recycled 55% of the all waste that made it to the Okhla 
landfill.89 Jindal’s plant, by contrast recycles only 20% of this waste. This is not simply 
because they burn the rest for energy. Jindal recycles 20% of incoming waste because 
they are legally required to as per the tender contract from the MCD.  If the requirement 
were lower, Jindal would incinerate more waste and thus create electricity for themselves. 
This type of trade-off reflects the dangers of entrusting large businesses with public 
goods.  
            Solid waste that remains stagnant invariably begins emitting methane, a 
greenhouse gas (GHG) that is 25-72 times as potent as carbon dioxide. An argument 
often provided in defense of Waste-to-Energy is that such incinerators prevent waste 
from stagnating and thus reduce methane emissions. However, methane is generated by 
wet organic waste – much of which is present in the Okhla landfill – but which does not 
easily burn. Even if this biomass is burned, it produces carbon dioxide, which though less 
harmful than methane, is still harmful – a fact ignored by Jindal, as they don’t report 84% 
of their carbon dioxide emissions because of its biogenic origin.90 Jindal’s website goes 
so far as to claim that the Timarpur-Okhla incinerator will produce zero emissions 
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because of state-of-the-art pollution control technology.91 This seems unlikely given that 
the technology cost Jindal only $45 million. By contrast, an incinerator in Rostock, 
Germany that processes less than a third of Timarpur-Okhla’s waste per day, was fitted 
with a $120 million pollution control system so as to achieve zero emissions. In a 
depressing parallel with LANCER, Jindal too declared that the dioxins emitted from 
Timarpur-Okhla would not be dangerous to the nearby communities. A crowning irony in 
this case is that Timarpur-Okhla is registered under the Indian government’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) program, and is having its operations subsidized.  
 Given the obvious environmental dangers and costs, one wonders why the MCD 
imagined a Waste-to-Energy project was needed in Okhla. History seems to provide us 
with a clue. Jindal’s Timarpur-Okhla plant was not the first Waste-to-Energy incinerator 
to be built in the region. In 1987, the Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources 
(MNES)92 had commission a Danish company, Volund Milojotechnik, to build a Refuse 
Incinerator-cum-Power Generation Station (a technological precursor of Waste-to-
Energy) at the very same landfill.93 This plant, built to incinerate 300 tons of waste a 
day94 operated for only 21 days before it had to be closed down due to the poor quality of 
incoming waste. Several government enquiries were made in the wake of this debacle, 
and yet, two decades later, an incinerator was being planned on the same location. Could 
it be that the nature (not quantity) of Delhi’s waste had changed so much in this time? 
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Likely not. Rather, a pro-technology ideology seems to have ossified in Indian 
governmental discourse.  
 ‘Technologically advanced,’ and capital driven projects like Jindal’s are being 
promoted as environment-friendly regardless of the applicability to a given situation, or 
their larger social costs. This agenda owes as much to the Indian government’s general 
inability to understand the informal sector as it does to any power nexus that exists 
between businesses and government officials. Given India’s pro-business focus after the 
country’s economic liberalization in 1991, it is unsurprising that civic bodies like the 
MCD find it easier to recommend corporate based solutions to garbage problems that 
tackle the more delicate informal sector. As Chaturvedi notes, “Rather that viewing 
kabaris and waste pickers as political subjects with claims on the city’s amenities and 
spaces, or even as economic service providers, judges and planners have instead come to 
see them as disruptions to public order – a view that is often anchored in the crudest of 
bourgeois aesthetics."95 Such an institutional ideology also allows the MCD to remain 
blind to the socio-economic effects their environmental decision had on the Okhla 
wastepicking community.  
* 
 A year after the Jindal Waste-to-Energy plant commenced its operations, Chintan 
conducted a survey of almost all (429 of 450) residents that were left in Okhla’s three 
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residential subdivisions.96 The qualifier ‘were left’ is specifically used because within this 
one year there was a 40% decrease in Okhla’s population.97 As mentioned before, 
approximately 88% of Okhla’s residents depended on the landfill for their livelihood, and 
its corporate takeover effectively made it impossible to continue their lives there. Jindal’s 
arrival affected members of the community – landfill workers, scrap collectors; men, 
women, children – in different ways. Before parsing these differences, it is worth 
tabulating some facts. Within a year of the Jindal Waste-to-Energy plant’s operation: 
1. Okhla’s population decreased from 740 to 430.  
2. Okhla’s wastepicker population decreased 683 to 377 
3. Okhla’s landfill worker (a sub category of wastepicker) population decreased from 400 
to 105 
4. There has been a 5% decrease in the number of children attending school; 67% of 
these children are now working with waste.98 
 These facts make in unequivocally clear that Jindal has had a terrible impact on 
Okhla’s residents. In addition to surveying these residents, Chintan also interviewed 
many of them. These interviews dispel all doubts, if any existed, that the mass-migration 
from Okhla was due to the Jindal plant. No project, regardless of its environmental would 
be tolerated in a middle-class neighborhood were it to displace 40% of its population. 
MCD’s disregard for the Okhla mass-migration must thus be attributed to a deep-seated 
classism of the Indian government. Just as the LANCER plant was a result of 	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environmental racism, the Timarpur-Okhla plant is an sure case of environmental 
classism. Jindal and MCD could coldly respond to these claims by arguing that Okhla 
workers unemployment and displacement were merely a result of the free market’s 
operations. But such an answer fails to realize that Okhla’s wastepickers fundamentally 
exist outside the free market. Indeed, waste collection seems to be their only form of 
economic mobility. This is underscored by the fact that the proportion of wastepickers 
(despite the overall fall in population) in Okhla has remained the same even after Jindal’s 
arrival. If anything, there has been a shift from landfill work to segregation work. 
Wastepickers have responded to Jindal’s arrival in three major ways: by bribing officials 
to gain temporary access to landfills, by travelling greater distances to collect waste, and 
by employing their children that previously attended school.  
 It seems almost criminal that ‘environment-friendly’ workers should suffer such 
arbitrary traumas so that a large corporation can produce electricity at subsidized rates. 
These shocking statistics also underscores a central aspect of the Okhla wastepickers’ 
protests. Like CCSCLA, these wastepickers were fighting to retain their way of life, to 
retain control over their “painfully improvised survival niches in the city.”99 Their 
lifestyles were innately environment-friendly. But simply because it was informal, the 
MCD was willing to impose a system that both destroyed their community, and harmed 
the environment, merely so that they could proceed with their privation and formalization 
focused agenda. Cases like this make it clear that environmental work, if it is to be 
successful in socio-politically complex places like Delhi, must have a wide, holistic 	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understanding of the term ‘environment.’ Otherwise, traditional ‘environmental 
solutions’ such as Waste-to-Energy will be proposed, much to everyone’s detriment.  
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Conclusion 	  	  	  
Deep Ecologists advocate the inherent worth of every living creature, and 
consequently do not take an anthropocentric approach to environmentalism. On the 
surface, their aims would seem completely at odds with those of EJM activists. While this 
may be the case on an individual to individual (or group to group) basis, I do not think it 
holds as a principle in itself. Indeed, I believe that the same group could espouse both 
EJM and Deep Ecologist beliefs. For many of the issues defined as ‘environmental’ by 
MEGs, are have really systemic issues that just happen to have environmental 
ramifications. By focusing on the effect, rather than the underlying cause of 
environmental issues, MEGs narrow their understanding of what is really at stake. 
          A group may hold biocentric principles and still participate in EJM, because EJM 
activities, often enough, are focused on tackling discriminatory governmental or 
economic practices, not in addressing more abstract ideas such as humanity’s relationship 
with nature. To say that deep ecology and EJM are incompatible would be like arguing 
that a true belief in democracy is incompatible with living in a nation that practices 
discriminatory policies. This might be true in some extreme cases. By and large, 
however, people live in a manner that contradicts their most deeply felt principles. The 
problem with mainstream environmentalism, then, is that it no longer balances pragmatic 
action with principled action. In their haste to defend wilderness areas from the onslaught 
of civilization – an honorable intention – MEGs have failed to see that several questions 
they face are not about humanity’s relation with nature, but rather, about its relation with 
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its own economic and social systems. That is, they have provided shortsighted, 
‘principled’ responses to pragmatic questions of policy.  
 This is why it is imperative to question and re-evaluate our definitions of 
‘environment’ and ‘environmentalism’. Only by creating rigorous, socio-politically (as 
well as philosophically and scientifically) informed definitions for these terms, will EJM 
groups and MEGs be able to locate what they are fighting for, and who they are fighting 
against. Without intending to, CCSCLA and the Okhla wastepickers have made 
important strides towards creating such a definition. By tackling questions of policy from 
the first principles of life – the need for community, the need for healthy surroundings, 
the right to embrace an independent lifestyle – they have been able to clearly see the 
inter-connectedness of economic, political and environmental policy. Future individuals 
and groups will do well to embrace this lesson. 
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